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Introduction
In contemporary Cambodia, the neo-liberal rules and aspirations for development are
entrenched in patronage-based and authoritarian forms of governance wherein the
boundaries between public and private interests are blurry (Hughes, 2003; Springer,
2010). In the land sector in particular, the contradictions inherent in this multiplicity of
norms have had important socio-economic impacts on smallholder farmers as well as
political implications for the State (Un and So, 2011). In fact, tensions and struggles
revolving around questions of land access and control occupy a central place in the
political and social life of Cambodia: they shape the agrarian dynamics that affect the
lives of a large number of smallholder farmers, and they animate the media discussions
daily and are the subject of multiple political manoeuvres at all levels.
Claims to land are particularly disputed when they relate to the management of State
land, a fuzzy category produced and mobilised by the State in its development and
territorialisation efforts (Dwyer, 2015). State land can be categorised as State Public or
State Private land. State land is identified as Public when it provides services to all
citizens, but it can be reclassified as State Private when it loses its public interest use
(Royal Government of Cambodia, 2011). Even if the ownership remains with the State,
the reclassification is significant as State Private land can be transferred to the private
sector either by sale or by concession. Yet the definition of “public interest” is a relative
notion left to interpretation by State representatives. As State land is not publicly deli-
neated,1 State authorities can basically declare State Public or Private land to be any-
where. And in a context of patronage-based deviant governance, State land management
is thus often directed to private interests through capture by State representatives, local
elites, and foreign investors.
The upsurge in conflicts on State land also reflects a shift in the agricultural devel-
opment model in Cambodia. While smallholder farmers were at the centre of agricultural
development efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, they are now increasingly subordinated to
and excluded by processes that promote foreign direct investment and large-scale
agricultural modernisation. The government has granted large economic concessions
to domestic and foreign companies for agro-industrial investments2 on land deemed to be
underdeveloped and supposedly extraneous to public utility. The premise is that large-
scale concessions would support national development, creating employment opportu-
nities in rural areas and restoring “degraded” land (Neef et al., 2013). But companies
who are granted a concession contract often encroach upon land that is already cultivated
or used by smallholder farmers as farmland or common pool resources, resulting in direct
impacts on their livelihoods.
At the core of the issue are competing claims to land between smallholder farmers and
State authorities. The starting point of our investigation is that the way in which these
contradictions are addressed could potentially reveal something about the nature of
power and State formation processes in contemporary Cambodia.
The different land dispute resolution mechanisms are seen as notoriously biased,
politically, and usually unaffordable for smallholder famers (Cambodian Center for
Human Rights, 2013; Leuprecht, 2004; Subedi, 2012). A more recent period of
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repression in respect of social movements and the intimidation of land right activists by
the State has further limited the spaces of contestation and critical dialogues (Schoen-
berger et al., 2018). However, besides an increased authoritarianism, we suggest that
spaces of contestation and resistance exist. Our story is based on three case studies that
typify land struggle situations during which people have attempted and partly managed
to protect their land and livelihoods against economic [State] land concessions. Con-
ditions of successful resistance have received only scant attention in the Cambodian
literature on land relations (Baird, 2017). With this in mind, we are interested in learning
from conflict transformation processes to understand the conditions under which land
resistance operates more or less successfully. We argue that the arena of conflict man-
agement entails its own political opportunity structure and occurs through the production
of hybrid institutions, which are contingent outcomes of the negotiations between the
actors. Beyond the specificities of each particular conflict transformation trajectory,
State land management is a dynamic process that combines a calculus by authorities to
retain social legitimacy and to reproduce their sovereign power in respect of land.
This article is organised into four parts. First, we frame the argument drawing on State
formation theory and land conflicts. Second, we present our research methods and the
profiles of the land conflicts discussed in the case studies. The third section provides a
detailed description of the three land conflict transformations: the interplay between
stakeholders and their outcomes in terms of smallholder farmers’ land rights. Finally, we
discuss how the cases inform State formation processes in Cambodia.
Framing Conflicts in State Land Relations
In this article, we situate the mechanisms of State formation within what Sikor and Lund
(2009) present as the mutual production of a socially legitimate authority and land
property rights. The authors suggest that a relationship is nurtured between the authority
that sets rules to allocate and secure access to the land and those who use this land. A
relationship is produced because the process of supporting or complying with norms and
rules regarding the allocation of resources works to legitimise those with the authority to
implement the rules. In contrast, the process of contesting or resisting these rules tends to
discredit and weaken those with the authority in charge of these rules. A conflict on State
land signals a rupture in this “contract” between those representing the authority of the
State and the farmers (Lund, 2016). We thus suggest that the attempts to address this
fracture engage a confrontation and negotiation in State land relations.
Building on a rich literature relating to land conflicts and State-making in Cambodia,
we specify this theoretical point of departure in three ways. We first envisage land
conflicts as dynamic processes. Research on land conflict resolution and subsequent
State formation processes reveals that efforts to resolve disputes involve complex
negotiations with various levels of State authorities having different power relations and
practices that change over time (Young, 2016). In particular, we do not see the State as a
static power. It changes tone, position, and tactics depending on pressures and oppor-
tunities. The literature refers to the notion of “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow,
1994), which suggests that the change in power structure opens windows of opportunities
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for rural movements to resist. In 2012, for instance, the government issued an order
(known as Order 01) that established a moratorium on new Economic Land Concessions
(ELCs). Order 01 also initiated a process of revision for ongoing ELC projects as well as
a land titling campaign aiming to provide smallholder farmers with land tenure security
when their land rights were disputed by ELCs. Analysts suggest that the measures were
politically motivated as they aimed to calm the social unrest ignited by the development
of ELCs just before important communal and national elections (Biddulph andWilliams,
2017; Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015). But as Schoenberger (2017) also argues,
Order 01 created a rupture in the pre-existing tenure arrangements by sending agents of
the central State out into the frontiers. Recently, the government established a coun-
trywide initiative based within the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and
Construction to address land conflicts (Sek, 2017). It also reorganised the National
Authority for Land Dispute Resolution to investigate and resolve high-profile land
disputes and oversee land dispute resolution by the Cadastral Commissions and relevant
authorities (Pech, 2018).
These initiatives, such as the upland titling campaign, ELCs evaluation or country-
wide campaign to tackle land conflicts, raise all sorts of questions which cannot be
addressed here. But given the resources mobilised by the government to implement
them, they clearly indicate that the authority of the State is increasingly responsive to the
erosion of its legitimacy resulting from abuses of land rights, particularly those of
smallholder farmers.
Second, despite authoritarianism, the sovereign power of the central State is exer-
cised through or challenged by a series of actors – at subnational and supranational
levels – that all have a certain level of autonomy and some capacity to influence the
course of actions. These complex webs of State authorities can either enhance or hinder
land conflict resolution mechanisms. But land relations are animated by a large
diversity of actors going far beyond the State and smallholder farmers. They also
involve a constellation of networked actors, more or less visible (Schoenberger and
Beban, 2018). Agency by local smallholder farmers and their internal and external
networks may influence and reshape the political opportunity structures to pressure
State authorities involved in land dispute resolution initiatives (Baird, 2017; Verkoren
and Ngin, 2017).
Third, the pressures put on the State to address land conflicts are increasingly coor-
dinated and result from the multi-scalar collective action of community, civil society,
and transnational actors over space and time (Beban et al., 2017; Young, 2017). Power is
unequally distributed among the actors involved, yet it is not always exercised in a
coercive way. It also works in more subtle ways through informal political–business
networks that are the fabric of patronage politics and are definitively a key aspect in
political decision-making in Cambodia. These networks constitute what Beban et al.
(2017) call the “power of informality,” which interacts with formal rules of law (Ngin
and Verkoren, 2015). Similarly, inharmonious practices among State actors “through
their everyday negotiations and actions to accumulate land and capital” complicate and
exacerbate State-making processes (Mahanty, 2017).
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Land Conflicts on State Land in Cambodia: The Magnitude
of the Problem
Several organisations are committed to monitoring land conflicts in Cambodia, including
governmental bodies. The figures they release differ because the methodologies and
criteria used to compute them are based on different definitions of conflicts and rely on
different sources of information. However, they all suggest that the magnitude of the
problem is significant.
During the period 2000–2013, land conflicts and resultant evictions affected 770,000
people (ADHOC, 2014). According to the data collected by LICADHO (2014), the
number of people affected by State-involved land conflicts between 2000 and 2014
passed the half-million mark. Based on a monitoring of media sources and reports from
network members, the NGO Forum on Cambodia (2015) reported that a cumulated
number of 352 land disputes broke out between 1990 and 2014, of which 77 per cent
remain unresolved.
The problems have worsened as a result of the granting of ELCs. A total of 286
contracts relating to large-scale plantations were established in Cambodia by the end
of December 2012 – all of these are located in the peripheral upland regions of the
country – covering a total area 2,188,413 hectares, 92 per cent of which consists of
ELCs. However, the rise in conflicts resulting from ELC mismanagement incenti-
vised the government to issue a moratorium on new concessions in 2012 and initiate
a full review of the existing ones. This is ongoing. In total, more than 30 ELCs have
been cancelled, while 126 have been revised suggesting a total area decrease of
779,338 hectares. As a result of this reform, the total number of large-scale plan-
tations has been reduced to 255, covering a total area of 1,401,551 hectares, 87 per
cent of which consists of ELCs (Diepart and Sem, 2018). This shows that the issue
of conflicts that has ignited the land concession landscape has been taken seriously
by the government.
Up to 2015, 158 ELCs caused conflicts affecting 35,604 households or 134,309
hectares of land (NGO Forum, 2016). In 2014 alone, ELCs caused 86 land disputes,
affecting 17,150 households or 78,890 people (NGO Forum, 2015).
Research Methods
This study analyses three cases of land conflicts in three different provinces. These cases
were selected because they present situations in which people in the communities
who are affected have attempted to protect their land and livelihoods against land
encroachment – and have partially succeeded. For each case, we elicit the place of the
peasantry and its agency to resist and engage in negotiations with a complex web of
actors including multi-level State authorities, markets, and civil society actors. The cases
– presented in Figure 1 and in Table 1 – are located across the northern regions of the
country. They involve different ethnic groups including indigenous peoples and
investment companies from different countries in the Mekong region.
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Figure 1. Location of Case Studies (mapping by the authors).
Table 1. Summary of the Characteristics of Each Case.
No Name of the case
Start date
of conflict or
confrontation
Company
name Affected area
Ethnic
group
1 Blood sugar: the
internationalization
of a land conflict
2012 Mitr Phol Residential area and farming
area in five villages in
Oddar Meanchey
province
Kuoy
2 Jarai Resistance in
Taing Mlou village
2014 Angkor Gold Forest area in Taing Mlou
village, Nhang commune,
Andong Meas district,
Rattanakiri province
Jarai
3 The messy
intersections
between migration
and ELCs in
Khseum
2011 Binh Phuoc
Rubber
2 Company
Residential area and
plantation farm in
Khseum commune, Snuol
district, Kratie province
Khmer
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 The blood sugar case in Oddar Meanchey province involves a sugar cane planta-
tion managed by a Thai company interested in selling sugar to Europe under the
duty-free Everything But Arms (EBA) mechanism. The plantation is located in a
frontier area in the north of the country (Figure 1) and has affected five villages.
The area is home to the Kuoy, an indigenous ethnic group, but has also taken in a
large number of Khmer migrants from different parts of the country. These
migrants are mainly engaged in cassava production, but there have also been
attempts by a local group to protect the forest through Community Forestry
arrangements.
 The resistance case in Rattanakiri has involved the village of Taing Mlou, popu-
lated by the Jarai community who are an indigenous ethnic group living in Cam-
bodia. The village is situated on a hill measuring 5 km2 that, until the end of the
1990s, was covered by dense forest and agricultural land mixed in a swidden
mosaic. Since 2007, the whole region surrounding the village has been influenced
by agricultural (rubber and cassava) and mining concessions (gold). The land use
is now dominated by agro-industrial crops – rubber, cashew nut, and cassava
plantations, as well as rice fields. Unlike the case outlined earlier, there are no
in-migrants as the Jarai do not allow outsiders to settle in their village.
 Khseum commune consists of seven villages located in the Snuol district of Kratie
province. The area was subject to timber logging operations in the 1990s under a
forest concession acquired by the Samling Group. Samling ceased operations in
1999, but the roads built to transport timber logs facilitated subsequent illegal
logging activities and also provided an opportunity for clearing forests for cash
crop cultivation. The rapid and massive development of agriculture has attracted a
considerable number of immigrants from different corners of the country. The
commune is situated on fertile red soil that is favourable to agro-industrial devel-
opment, especially rubber. The main investor is Binh Phuoc, a Vietnamese com-
pany named after the Vietnamese province adjacent to Kratie. Binh Phuoc is a
member of the Vietnamese Rubber Group.
The research emerged and was conducted in the context of a learning alliance involving
a number of national organisations interested in collaborating to study land conflict trans-
formation processes. The research process was supported by the Mekong Region Land
Governance project. The third author took the leading role in coordinating fieldwork. The
first and second authors are responsible for framing the analysis. The investigation into the
cases is primarily based on the field research that took place from December 2015 to early
January 2016. The field team consisted of three people who spent approximately one week
in each location. They conducted a total of twelve key informant interviews (including
with representatives from community-based organisations) and organised five focus group
discussions involving a total of forty five participants. We also undertook interviews with
representatives from legal organisations to gain an insight into the conflict resolution from
their perspective. The field research team also benefited from their personal familiarity
with the three locations, having been involved in field research in those areas since 2014
and even earlier in the case of Khseum commune.
16 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38(1)
Blood Sugar: The Internationalisation of a Land Conflict
Context and Origin of the Conflict
In 2001, the European Union (EU) launched the EBA initiative to provide duty-free
access to the European market for less developed countries (Equitable Cambodia &
Inclusive Development International, 2013). The initiative aims to promote economic
growth through agricultural investment, including in sugar cane plantations. Seizing this
opportunity, Thai companies jumped into the sugarcane business in three provinces of
Cambodia: Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, and Oddar Meanchey. In Oddar Meanchey, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Environ-
ment granted 17 ELCs covering an area of 108,019 hectares (Sherchan, 2015). Of these,
Angkor Sugar Company, Cambodia Cane and Sugar Valley Company, and Tonle Sugar
Company were granted ELCs in February 2008 for sugarcane production, covering a
total of 33,846 hectares. These companies are related to the Thai sugar giant Mitr Phol
(an important sugar supplier to Coca-Cola) and have an affiliation with Ly Yong Phat, a
prominent tycoon and ruling party senator in Cambodia (Equitable Cambodia &
Inclusive Development International, 2013).
In 2008, conflict over land was ignited between the sugarcane companies and the
villagers when the companies’ guards started to demarcate their concession area. The
companies also undertook a series of actions to clear the land and forced villagers to
move out. Of the twenty six villages reported to have been affected by the actions of
these three companies, O’Bat Moan and Bos villages suffered the most severe impact.
In 2008 and 2009, 214 families from both villages were forced to leave their residential
land, and their houses were burned down by security guards and hired military per-
sonnel, working in agreement with local authorities (Sherchan, 2015). In addition to
the affect they had on residential and agricultural land, the three companies also
grabbed almost half of the originally proposed area of the nearby Community Forest
(Rattanak Ruka) initiated since 2000 and consisting of 26,036 hectares of evergreen
and semievergreen forestland.
Conflict Transformation Processes
At first, the villagers had no inkling of the existence of the land concession projects
as they were simply not consulted during the identification process.3 The presence
of surveyors hired by the companies, and the initial demarcation of land, came as a
surprise to them. In response, the villagers turned to the local authorities and the
companies for an explanation. In 2008, the villagers gathered in front of the com-
pany office in Samraong, the provincial town. As is often the case in such cir-
cumstances, the companies refused to negotiate, arguing that they were in legal
receipt of the land from the government. Later, villagers approached the provincial
governor who convened a meeting with the company representatives who reiterated
that the concessions had been granted on State land and that the communities were
thus not affected. The villagers filed a petition to the cabinet of the prime minister,
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the Ministry of Interior, and MAFF. In response, the deputy provincial governor
promised to address the issue and find a solution.
In 2008, an ad hoc Dispute Resolution Committee was established to examine the
conflict. The committee consisted of representatives from the municipality, the Cadastral
Commission, the Forestry Administration, the District Chief, and the police and military
law enforcement. This committee was first tasked with assessing and preparing the list of
agricultural lands that formed the territories of each village. The committee then sur-
veyed the land claimed by villagers that fell within the concession area and found that a
total area of 9,428 hectares was claimed by both parties.
As a result, the provincial governor agreed to return cleared, claimed, and cul-
tivated agricultural land to the villagers via a land swap mechanism to relocate the
agricultural land of the families affected by the concession. The Dispute Resolution
Committee undertook a detailed survey of the area using global positioning system,
and the commune and village chiefs were asked to find vacant land in their villages
to provide compensatory land for villagers. But due to limited land availability in
the commune, the area identified for the agricultural land swap was already occu-
pied by families, who were asked to allocate part of their land to the newcomers. At
the end of this long land swap process, 3,588 hectares were provided for the families
affected in exchange for the 9,428 hectares lost to the company. The solution was
unsatisfactory for everyone. It made the original occupants of the area identified as
land swap angry about and resentful of the newcomers who received some of their
land. Likewise, the villagers affected by the land grab were unhappy because they
had lost more than half of their land, and the agricultural land that was provided in
the swap was poor with rocky soil.
To execute the land swap, the recipients had to sign a contract named “Resolution to
End the Dispute between the People and said Companies” containing detailed infor-
mation about each recipient’s household and the amount of land being accepted. Even
though the villagers were still frustrated with this land swap, the majority accepted this
contract because they were afraid of receiving nothing amid threats and violence.
In the process, the villagers also turned to civil society organisations for assistance.
This move was successful as a number agreed to provide legal support. These support
groups launched national and international campaigns to demand justice and fair com-
pensation. Domestically, they helped villagers to send petition letters to the local and
national authorities for intervention; internationally, they created a campaign to persuade
international organisations, governments, and companies to put pressure on the
“offending” companies. They particularly urged the EU to advocate for the placing of
restrictions on the import of sugarcane from Mitr Phol on the grounds that this company
had failed in its basic commitment to human rights law (Equitable Cambodia & Inclusive
Development International, 2013). In a series of meetings with government officials, the
EU ambassador to Cambodia said that they had made good progress on the issue of Mitr
Phol and on compensation for the villagers in Oddar Meanchey who had been affected.4
In a parallel process, another campaign was initiated in partnership with the National
Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) to put pressure on Mitr Phol to stop
human rights violations committed by their sugarcane business in Oddar Meanchey and
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to provide reasonable compensation for villagers who had been affected. The NHRCT
was persuaded to join the investigation and to support the dissemination of the results. In
a dissemination workshop in mid-2015, the Thai committee presented the results from
the investigation, which highlighted the severe impact the sugarcane business has having
on villages, especially those of O’Bat Moan and Bos. The committee urged the Thai
government to take action against the company, especially to encourage the provision of
compensation to cover the villagers’ losses.
Outcomes
As a result of these campaigns and because the financial risk of bankruptcy was too high,
the companies withdrew and their concession contracts were cancelled. A few local
villagers subsequently came back to cultivate rice on their former land. However, by
early January 2016, only ten families had returned to cultivate land that had been part of
the dispute. The other families indicated that the prevailing uncertainty about the future
of the disputed land discouraged them from returning and investing in it. However, the
land from the cancelled concessions is still under the management of MAFF, and it is
unclear what will become of it. Will it be reallocated to the smallholder farmers as
pledged by the government during the implementation of the Order 01, or will it be
reassigned as State land and reallocated to another investor?
Jarai Resistance in Taing Mlou Village
Context and Origin of the Conflict
In 2007, the Jarai5 community in Taing Mlou village experienced their first exposure to
a foreign company – specifically, a rubber and cassava company named Pram Pi
Makara.6 Back then, the company and local authorities explained to the local people that
they wanted to bring development to the village by building new roads and schools and
by creating new employment opportunities. The company tried to convince the elders by
promising to give back the plantation land to the community after they had finished
operations. However, Jarai villagers were successful in resisting the proposed
encroachment by this company and managed to protect their land.
Four years later, a company called Angkor Gold came to conduct mining exploration
in Taing Mlou. Angkor Gold is a Canada-based company that started operations in
Cambodia in 2009. At the initial stage, Angkor Gold’s main activities focused on gold
and copper mining exploration in the Northeast area of Cambodia. In 2011, a Memor-
andum of Understanding signed between the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy and
the Angkor Gold Company paved the way for the company to acquire licences – for
exploration purposes only – over a total area of 1,556 km2 in Rattanakiri province. In
April 2014, a Chinese consortium became the major shareholder in the company and
injected more than USD 10 million to boost exploration activities in Cambodia.
Group discussions with the village chief, prominent young leaders and elders, and key
informant interviews conducted on 26 December 2015, confirmed that, in 2011, the
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company had sent workers and experts to dig and drill land in different locations in Taing
Mlou to test the level of mineral deposits in the area. The presence of the company’s
workers was a source of concern for the villagers, who started meeting to discuss the land
digging activities and to mobilise internal resources through discussions among fellow
villagers. With the support of partner NGOs, the villagers discovered that those workers
were affiliated with the Angkor Gold Company and, as other Jarai communities in
Oyadav district7 could verify, they had already cleared spirit forestland.
The villagers’ wariness of outsiders, coupled with intrusion on their land by the
company employees, became the root cause of complaints.
Conflict Transformation Processes
From 2012 to 2015, the company arranged three formal meetings with the villagers.
They came to the village and presented the results of their mining exploration as well
as the measures they would be taking to reduce the impact on farmland, trees, and
water quality. They told the villagers that the mining exploration would not affect even
small trees because they would drill only small holes to acquire samples for experi-
ments. In addition, the company promised to build new roads, schools, and ponds and
to bring electricity to Taing Mlou village. However, all this was received with by the
villagers with great scepticism. In addition to the three formal meetings with the
community, the company also sent its people to conduct interviews with every single
family in the village. But their efforts to persuade the villagers to accept the mining
operations failed.
One local village leader described the atmosphere at such village meetings in the
following way:
They brought a lot of biscuits and beef to the meeting. They asked us to eat, but we refused
to eat their food. So, the company representatives told us to show them some respect
because of their willingness to offer food for the villagers. However, the villagers responded
that they were afraid that, after eating beef and biscuits, they would lose their land. Thus,
they preferred not to eat in order to protect their land.
This quote underlines the refusal of the local group to compromise with the company
because, in their eyes, the acceptance of “biscuits and beef” could be seen by the
company as their consent to give land away. More fundamentally, they did not agree
to engage in negotiations on the terms that were unilaterally decided by one party
involved in the conflict.
After the failure of conciliation and the soft communication approaches, the company
started trying to scare the villagers with violent threats. A few times, the representatives
of the company (Khmer workers) and local authorities told the villagers that they would
use military force or security guards to deal with the Taing Mlou people. However, this
failed to frighten the villagers or to deter them in any way: indeed, it might actually have
strengthened their collective voice. They stood firm in protecting their natural resources
regardless of the consequences. The roles of the traditional elders and the community
chief were key here. As the leaders committed to protecting land and forests, they had a
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strong role in influencing the thinking and practice of the community. They placed more
importance on the mobilisation of the villagers against the company than on their
relations with higher authorities as they rarely joined meetings convened by commune
authorities. Two respondents (a young man and an old lady) told us that women played a
crucial role in the campaign to protect their resources. In one of the meetings, the women
told the company representatives and local authority that “we are strong and we could
serve in the army if needed. We are committed to protecting our resources even if we
become physically impaired.”
Later, villagers were also invited to join meetings chaired by the commune chief.
These meetings were among other attempts to persuade the villagers to allow the
company to start mining exploration in Taing Mlou and to re-emphasise that this would
bring development to the village. But despite a few attempts by the commune authorities,
the villagers in Taing Mlou remained united in their resolution to deny permission for
any concessions in their community. The villagers told the local authority that they were
not against development initiatives, but that they wanted development that was not
harmful to their land or forest. One prominent male villager (aged around thirty) said:
“we want development to allow us to go and buy products from the market while we
continue enjoy meals on our forestland; we do not want development to drive us out of
our land.”
After prior consultation with the company, the commune authority presented two
proposals to the villagers. The first consisted of a study tour to visit Lumphat to see
other villages that had experienced mining exploration. They invited fifteen villagers
from Taing Mlou to take part, but the villagers refused the offer because they were
afraid of being cheated. Second, the commune authority proposed a joint trip into the
forest in order to identify the resource boundary and jointly delineate mining explo-
ration areas. The villagers also rejected this offer, saying that they had no reason to take
a separate walk into the forest because they went there often to collect non-timber
forest products.
The commune authority then started to threaten villagers arguing that there was
little hope that they could fight against the company who had already received an
exploration licence from the central authority. However, the villagers maintained
their stance. During negotiations between the villagers and the district authority, the
village representatives refused to allow the company to enter their village, and the
district authority blackmailed by threatening to isolate the community from any
further development interventions. Commenting on the episode, some respondents told
us
even if we are given dollars, we do not know how to use them. We are illiterate and we do
not know how to live on fresh air. We only know how to live from our land. Thus, we have
to protect our land and forest for our livelihoods.
Outcomes
The villagers had the last word and the company withdrew. The strategy deployed by the
Jarai community in Taing Mlou was to refuse cooperation with the company
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representatives regardless of the efforts they and the local authorities made. The villagers
were firmly united in protecting their resources because they had a robust internal
strength that resulted from their past experience with agricultural concessions. The
practice of their traditional customs in respecting their leaders (Mekantreanh) appeared
to dominate. They listened to the advice and decisions of their leaders because they were
seen to work to protect their people’s interests. It was noteworthy that the leaders in the
village set up an informal group of elders, comprising about fifty people, to be advisers to
the village with the role of monitoring the general situation of the village and helping to
resolve potential problems. As a result, Angkor Gold has never been to the village areas
for exploration purposes.
The Messy Intersections between Migration and ELCs in
Khseum
Context and Origin of the Conflict
Since 2004, the population of Khseum commune (Snuol district, Kratie province) has
significantly increased due to the in-migration of people from lowland regions of the
country. As a result, the existing villages have expanded significantly to create sub-
village clusters (krom). Initially, Peam Por Obei and Trapaing Chhouk were clusters in
Srae Thmey village, one of the eight villages of Khseum commune.8 This area was
recognised as a krom by the commune authority in 2012. Subsequently, the continued
influx of migrants led to the formation of a new sub-village area named Trapaing
Chhouk, consisting mainly of houses stretching along a road from Peam Por Obei. The
migrant population has come to these areas in search of new land for residence and for
agriculture. In 2008, 60 migrant families came to live in the Peam Por Obei area, and, in
2009, another 181 arrived. By 2012, there were 405 new migrant families installed in the
area9 of Peam Por Obei and Trapaing Chhouk.
Such migrations away from central plain areas are representative of a wider process
across Cambodia. These movements are primarily driven by a search for agricultural
land and, to a large extent, they can be seen as an expression of the agency of peasant
households in responding to rural poverty (Diepart et al., 2014). However, the migrant
population has little security in respect of land tenure under the 2001 Land Law insti-
tutions because the land they appropriate is classified as State land.
Between 2010 and 2011, ELCs were granted to five companies in and surrounding
Khseum commune: the Memot Rubber Plantation (2010), Sovann Vuthy (2010), Trach
Nhiem Han Dau (2010), Binh Phuoc Kratie Rubber 2 (2011), and Eastern Rubber
Cambodia (2011). The Vietnamese rubber company, Binh Phuoc Rubber 2, has been in
conflict with the local communities in relation to its operations in the Khseum commune
since 2011 because the concession covers the new settlement area of Peam Por Obei and
Trapeang Chhouk mentioned earlier.10 The conflict was ignited in 2011 when people
living in Peam Por Obei encountered some people – claiming to be representatives of
Binh Phuoc Rubber 2 Company – while they were marking ELC boundaries with cement
demarcation poles.
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Conflict Transformation Processes
In 2012, during the land titling campaign known as Order 01, 300 plots of land were
recognised by a temporary letter (chong sanleuk) from the students who were in charge
of the titling efforts.11 However, the land was not measured and no land titling was
delivered. Afterwards, in order to gain more tenure security on their land, representatives
from Peam Por Obei and Trapeang Chhouk submitted a request for land registration to
the district authorities. The request aimed to obtain titles on a total area of 2,025 hectares
based on the assumption that each of the 405 households would receive 5 hectares.
At the same time, the communities of Peam Por Obei and Trapeang Chhouk have
been threatened with land encroachment by a group of people claiming to work for Binh
Phuoc Rubber 2 Company. Without any response from the local authorities – especially
at the district level – some community leaders submitted a complaint to a Cambodian
NGO working on land rights. However, this request related only to a close-knit group
comprising 104 households who occupied around 200 hectares of farmland. These 104
households consisted of migrants coming from the same region who were bound by
stronger social ties with their fellow migrants than they were with the group of 405
households as a whole.
In 2012, after receiving the complaint document from the villagers, the Cambodian
NGO started an investigation and provided legal support to help the villagers who filed it
(the 104 households). In the process, the District Land Management Committee con-
ducted a survey to check the legality of the people’s settlement. They explained that the
104 families were living in a State forest area under the management of the Forestry
Administration, which had been allocated to the company. However, the company
agreed to concede the 200 hectares claimed by the 104 households and to dig a ditch to
delineate this area from their concession land.
This manoeuvre put the other 301 households living in the Peam Por Obei and
Trapeang Chhouk area in a difficult situation as they were excluded from the deal
although some of their land was also located inside the concession licensed area. This
created tension, resentment, and a split in the community. But the determination of the
301 households was undiminished, and they continued their advocacy campaign to target
elite politicians and national authorities. They submitted a request for a Social Land
Concession (SLC) to the national institutions – especially the cabinet of the Prime
Minister Hun Sen. SLCs are tools the government has promoted to address the problem
of landlessness and near landlessness. They constitute a legal mechanism to transfer
Private State land for social purposes to households who lack land for residential and/or
family farming purposes.
The villagers also asked the provincial authority to intervene and received promises
that this would happen after the national elections in July 2013. But, to the people’s
consternation, the national elections came and went with no activity, so they filed
another complaint to the national authorities. The complaint strategy included the sub-
mission of petitions and a letter of intervention, the organisation of protests, and a long
march from the village to Phnom Penh. The march comprised about 100 people who
walked to the National Assembly and the cabinet of the prime minister. As a result, an
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intervention letter (instructive letter) was issued to the subnational government, espe-
cially the provincial governor, for appropriate action.
The Binh Phuoc Rubber 2 Company started activity that affected the movement of
villagers whose land was inside the concession licensed area. They set up a number of
barriers to prevent people from reaching their farms and homes, intended as a warning.
They placed security guards along the road to the plantation and prevented access to the
farms, which made the villagers furious. To deal with the situation, two human rights
NGOs facilitated a meeting with community representatives to start an investigation.
They also sent another letter to the provincial governor. As a result, even though both
parties could not reach an agreement, in 2013, the company unblocked the road to the
plantations and the farms, allowing the villagers temporary access for cultivation.
The first national response to the issue came in 2014 when the provincial governor
and a representative from MAFF, led by Deputy Prime Minister Yim Chhaily, met with
the villagers. This group of authorities offered 100 hectares to the villagers, which meant
that each family would receive less than one hectare of land. Consequently, the villagers
refused the offer, which led to another approach submitted, with support from the
Cambodian NGOs, to the cabinet of the prime minister, as well as to that of Yim Chhaily.
On 30 April 2014, the company conducted an aggressive demolition of 274 houses,
but none of the people moved out. Instead, the outraged householders protested by
blocking road number 115. The subnational government did not make a single move. On
5 May 2014, about 300 people went to Phnom Penh, staying at the Samaki Meanchey
pagoda, to submit another petition to the government. On 27 May 2014, the provincial
governor of Kratie came to negotiate, bringing another offer, and produced a detailed list
of the people in the movement and the land areas they occupied.12 Finally, the people
agreed to return home and to accept the 750 hectares of land granted to them as an SLC
during this latest negotiation. However, as Lamb et al. (2017) rightly note, there was
confusion over who was eligible to gain a plot of land within the SLC because the
government did not make explicit the number of families for whom the SLC was
intended, nor the criteria for eligibility.
On 2 and 3 June 2014, the commune and district authorities came to identify the
families and to give them temporary land receipts. However, the number of families at
this point had increased to 746,13 which was not proportionate to the land size that was
initially requested. Because of the constant increase in the number of in-migrants into the
Trapeang Chhouk area (which, according to community representatives, had reached
791 households by April 2016), the total land area requested by the people reached 4,275
hectares, amounting to 5 hectares for each of 855 households, which was much higher
than the area requested by the communities in the first place (2,025 hectares).
Outcomes
Out of the land claimed by the people, the company returned only 750 hectares. There are
now fences surrounding the other contested land, while the remainder is now categorised
as State forestland and cannot therefore be used by the people of Peam Por Obei and
Trapeang Chhouk. This issue remains unresolved, although the situation between the
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company and the villagers is now calm, especially in Trapaing Chhouk, which is located
within the area licensed by the company.
Resistance and the Transformation of Conflicts on State Land in
Cambodia: A Discussion
The three cases have revealed situations in which State land relations were in crisis as a
result of the encroachment upon “State” land cultivated by smallholder farmers. But
what did we learn from the conflict transformation processes and their particular out-
comes? And how does that inform our knowledge about the dynamics of State land
management in Cambodia?
Lessons from the Cases
We have presented three cases in which resolution processes have both commonalities
and divergences. A common feature was the involvement of NGOs in the advocacy
campaigns, the provision of legal advice, and the facilitation of complaint filing. Another
common characteristic was the multiplicity and diversity of stakeholders that the vil-
lagers approached to seek solutions. Moreover, a lack of trust by the people towards local
authorities, particularly at commune and district levels, was a common element in the
three cases. Also, these cases pinpointed the absence of the implementation, or the partial
enforcement, of the existing legal instruments regardless of which parties in the dispute
were in the wrong.
However, these three cases illustrate different resolution mechanisms and varying
relationships between stakeholders, which resulted in different outcomes. The Mitr Phol
case presents the weak role of State agencies, especially local authorities, in land con-
flicts that involve a big international company. The resolution process highlighted the
fact that the local authorities were not effective, nor were they trusted by the villagers.
What worked in this case was the collective and coordinated strategy of NGOs, along
with the determination of the villagers to identify the company’s business partners or
buyers and launch concerted advocacy campaigns targeting influencers who had a stake
in the issue (i.e. the EU, Coca-Cola, and the Thai HRC). Moreover, the company’s
economic interests, rather than corporate social responsibility or human rights, com-
pelled it to withdraw from the concession. Even so, this issue remains unresolved,
reflecting the weak rule of law in Cambodia.
The Taing Mlou case presents a resolution process that comprised both negotiation
and intimidation by the local authorities and the company. This case was unique in that
a series of peaceful negotiations were conducted to convince the villagers to allow the
company to conduct mining in their village. Moreover, despite various threats, no
violence occurred. Two key factors enabled the villagers to safeguard their village
from the company’s incursion. First, their vigilance – inspired by the negative
experiences of their village and those of others – encouraged them to categorically
decline any offer delivered by the company and local authorities. Second, their col-
lective might, embedded in their cultural norms, empowered them to make a unified
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and firmly footed stand against the encroachment. This social capital, in the sense
given by Pierre Bourdieu (1994), was reflected in, and bolstered by their Jarai identity,
their traditional practice of leadership, and the current practices of the elderly advisor
group and reciprocal help groups (such as the savings group). These cultural and
livelihood assets were moulded together to form a mighty, collective bargaining power
against the external forces.
The Khseum case illustrates a “political opportunity structure” that the local com-
munity employed in the resolution process. Since they had lived on the State land, they
took advantage of the Order 01 titling campaign to mobilise authorities at multiple levels
and had them check the land situation on the ground. Further, sensing the populist
politics, the villagers sought assistance from the political elite, such as the prime minister
and a deputy prime minister, before the 2013 national election. They also approached
NGOs that offered legal support and facilitated documentation, mediation, and com-
plaint filing. This case illustrates that the social dynamics of resistance can exacerbate
the tensions and complicate the conflict resolution when they are not structured and
organised to speak with one voice. Moreover, it reveals a lack of enforcement of the
existing legal instruments and a tendency to compromise in the negotiation process,
which worsened the conflict.
There are challenges in comparing the cases as they each took place in a specific
context with particular actors and dynamics, but a comparison does help to identify the
different features that led to the varying degrees of success of each case. In the case of
Mitr Phol, the intervening NGOs worked in a concerted manner to investigate the
conflict, identify the chief influencers within the company, plan coordinated lobby
campaigns, and attack the company on an economic front in presenting evidence of
human rights abuses. However, in the other two cases, the intervening NGOs appeared
uncoordinated in their efforts to assist the villagers in the resolution processes. While the
villagers in the three cases approached various levels of State institutions, the com-
munities in the Khseum case were distinct in the sense that they tapped into the
opportunities at the right time and with the right actors. This approach to some extent
helped them to secure some land even if they were considered illegal trespassers on
State land with regard to the Land Law institution. Another divergent pattern was
evident in the unity of the communities in the face of threats or violence, and this had a
strong influence on the success or failure of the cases. In the Khseum case, the resisting
population consisted of an assemblage of different migrant groups who had no history
in common. This made the community socially fragile, which enabled outsiders to
exploit the resolution process. The bonding ties with communities in the Taing Mlou
case were historically grounded, which enabled them to protect their resources from
encroachment by external forces. Finally, these cases elucidated two different modes
employed by the companies to deal with the villagers. In the Mitr Phol and Khseum
cases, the companies used forceful and violent means to evict the people, while the
company in the Taing Mlou case used peaceful negotiations and later issued verbal
intimidation through local authorities. These tactics elicited corresponding responses
from the communities.
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From Political Opportunity Structures to Contingent Rules
The cases show that, while formal laws and regulations were referred to during the
resolution processes, they were bent, compromised, and manipulated by the actors
involved in the conflicts. This occurred in the particular remit of “political opportunity
structures” – in the sense of Tarrow (1994) – that are inherent to power dynamics within
the State (e.g. Order 01) but also commercial agreements between States (e.g. EBA).
A political opportunity structure is, however, often a necessary but never a sufficient
condition for resisting parties to become audible and engage in meaningful negotiations
with the State and other parties. It takes not only dedication and courage – given the
inherent risks – but also the capacity to mount a collective action. The agency of the
communities to organise the mobilization is central in the resistance movements we have
described. This is a finding that echoes the work of Verkoren and Ngin (2017) on land
grabbing in Cambodia. In particular, the cases have shown how a collective mobilization
is shaped by historically constructed social relations nurtured around a particular place. It
relates to what Bourdier (2019) calls the “socio-territorial order and social fabric on
which relies a local citizenship that regulates the access to land resources.”
Collective action is driven by the communities who are affected but is not limited to
their villages. The cases have also shown the importance of social networks to enhance
mobilization and resistance. Networks facilitated information flows among members and
enabled individuals or organisations that were not based in the villages to join the col-
lective action. The literature on land conflicts in Cambodia has already highlighted the
fact that the strength of resistance movements depends on social networks, of which
smallholder farmers are a part. But networks varied in our cases, and they went far
beyond the relationships nurtured between the community and the local civil society
organisation that were trying to defend their interests. While State authorities attempted
to legitimise their actions through formal laws and regulations, at times they also
engaged in arrangements with communities in informal ways. In certain instances,
community representatives reached out to authorities through secretive and exclusive
personalised networks to access the decision-making power or to help to bring the issue
to a higher level. This “power of informality” in the sense of Beban et al. (2017) is also
prominent in our case. But networks can also have a transnational scope and connect the
village community to global actors. The construction of all of these networks is also
nurtured over time, and they work most effectively when the different forces of the
networks operate in conjunction and are aligned in a timely and appropriate manner with
the collective action of the community that is affected.
When these conditions are met, land conflict management occurs through institu-
tional pluralism wherein hard law is one element in a wider continuum of statutory and
customary norms, including personalised networks or perceptions of justice that are
locally generated and validated. But the pluralism is not just the addition of multi-layered
institutions. These institutions are not mutually exclusive, but interact with each other
and are mutually enforced. It is the negotiation between actors along the conflict
transformation that blends them to create what we call “contingent rules.”
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We use the term “contingent” following Baird (2017). The cases presented here
indeed show that the resistance and the conflict transformation are dynamic and evolve
over time according to actors involved in the process and the balance of power between
them. They depend on particular conditions and are the specific outcomes of the
negotiation between actors. The production of “contingent rules” – reflecting the con-
cerns and preoccupations of the different actors – is possible when the conditions dis-
cussed earlier are met: a political opportunity structure, a capacity to organise on the part
of the communities affected and supportive social networks. “Contingent rules” reveal
that, despite the shrinking space of contestation, opportunities for resistance and nego-
tiation are still open and can potentially lead to successful results for smallholder farmers
to protect their land resources.
This point is usually overlooked in the literature on land conflicts in Cambodia. But
“contingent rules” do not suggest that actors are evolving on a level playing field.
Conflict transformation is still dominated by power and exclusion and tends to benefit
some groups at the expense of others. Beyond the specificities of each particular conflict
transformation trajectory, State land management is a dynamic process that combines a
calculus by authorities to retain social legitimacy and reproduce their sovereign power in
respect of land.
Conclusion
The granting of ECLs in Cambodia has frequently been associated with violent evictions
and dispossession under authoritarian forms of land governance. The three cases high-
lighted in our study exemplify how conflicts on State land create a rupture between those
representing the authority of the State and the farmers who claim rights to the land.
When a political opportunity structure opens, when the affected community organises
collective action and receives support from their various and differing social networks,
the actors involved in land conflicts mobilise statutory law and customary norms,
including patronage networks in which the State-making process is embedded. We have
argued that the conflict transformation processes produce “contingent rules” that are the
specific outcomes of the negotiation between actors. These processes highlight both non-
linearity and complexity in the land transformation processes.
Despite the increase in authoritarianism and the repression of land activists in
Cambodia, the production of “contingent rules” reveals that, nevertheless, spaces for
resistance and contestations do exist. We have tried to elicit the conditions under
which “contingent rules” may contribute to these movements. More attention could
be brought by researchers and activists to identify “contingent rules” and to
understand how actors mobilise them. This could be seen as an important pre-
requisite to support smallholder farmers in their attempts to secure access to and use
of land and natural resources.
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Notes
1. Economic Land Concessions are delineated but State land is not. The State cadastre that
formalises the different State land categories and differentiates between State Public and State
Private is not keeping track with the cadastre of private land.
2. Government grants of “Private State land” to domestic or foreign companies for agricultural
development cover areas of up to 10,000 hectares per contract (Royal Government of Cam-
bodia (2005).
3. According to sub-decree No. 146 on Economic Land Concessions, the relevant companies are
required to consult with the villagers who are affected before they start any activities on the
concession land.
4. Phnom Penh Post, dated 13 May 2015. Retrieved from http://m.phnompenhpost.com/national/
eu-making-progress-mitr-phol-sugar-disputes (29 January 2016).
5. The second largest indigenous group in Northeast Cambodia.
6. Pram Pi Makara translates as 7 January, which is the date when the Khmer Rouge was
overthrown by Vietnamese army forces in 1979.
7. In June 2014, the research team visited Peak village to study the current situation in respect of
mining (Angkor Gold) and its impact on the villagers’ livelihoods. The study discovered that
the villagers were concerned about the loss of non-timber forest products since the company
would not allow them to enter the forest where they used to collect them.
8. “Proposal for a Social Land Concession”: From Kompong Cham (258 families), Kratie (84
families), and Prey Veng (63 families) (27 January 2013).
9. “Proposal for a Social Land Concession” (11 March 2013).
10. In fact, the Peam Por Obei area is not within the company’s licensed area. Only Trapeang
Chhouk is.
11. “Proposal for Social Land Concession” (March 2013).
12. The Ministry of Interior, Provincial Authority of Kratie, Letter No 304, 28 May 2014.
13. In January 2016, the number of families increased to 2,000 and that number continues to
change. It was discovered that, when the people left to protest in Phnom Penh, the local
authority up to the district level brought their relatives and networks to come to register for
the land, too. And when the protesters came back from Phnom Penh, they arrived almost too
late to register for their own land.
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